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Is Meaning in Life a Positive Resource When Adjusting to Stressful Life Events? 
Login S. George, PhD 
University of Connecticut, 2017 
 
Having a sense of meaning in life is often considered to be a positive resource that can facilitate 
better adjustment to major stressors. However, few studies have directly and adequately 
examined this idea. The present study addresses this question by examining 1) if meaning 
predicts trajectories and changes in key distress-exacerbating factors and distress 2) if meaning 
buffers negative effects of distress-exacerbating factors on distress, and 3) if the different 
dimensions of meaning are differentially important in adjustment. The sample consisted of 180 
undergraduates prescreened to have had a recent stressor that they found stressful at 
prescreening. Participants were assessed at four time points over a 9-week period with three 
weeks in between each time point. At baseline, participants completed a measure of meaning; at 
all time points, participants completed measures of key distress-exacerbating factors and distress. 
Overall, results provided some evidence of meaning as a positive resource in adjustment. HLM 
analyses of adjustment trajectories showed that those with higher baseline meaning had better 
adjustment at baseline, although those with lower meaning seemed to catch up over time. 
Residual change regression models showed meaning to predict favorable changes in distress-
exacerbating factors and distress. Moderation analyses showed meaning to buffer the negative 
effects of distress-exacerbating factors on distress. Finally, the meaning dimension of 
comprehension appeared to be relatively more important in adjustment than were purpose and 
mattering. These results have implications such as greater support for clinical interventions 
aimed at fostering meaning, and the need for more multidimensional examinations of meaning. 
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Is Meaning in Life a Positive Resource When Adjusting to Stressful Life Events? 
Meaning in life is often theorized to be a protective factor for individuals adjusting to 
highly stressful life events such as illnesses and traumas (e.g., Breitbart et al., 2010; Frankl, 
1959/2006; Winger, Adams, & Mosher, 2015). However, researchers have not, to date, 
adequately examined this notion of meaning as a positive resource. The present study attempts to 
fill the gaps in the literature by examining if meaning predicts changes in key distress-
exacerbating factors and distress, if meaning buffers negative effects of distress-exacerbating 
factors on distress, and if the different dimensions of meaning are differentially important in the 
context of adjustment.  
Meaning in Life as a Positive Resource When Adjusting to Stressful Life Events  
A sense of meaning in life is thought to help individuals better adjust to and stay resilient 
in the face of major stressors (Frankl, 1959/2006; Winger, Adams, & Mosher, 2015). Those with 
high meaning are thought to be less impacted by stressors and better able to return to baseline 
functioning and well-being. Frankl (1959/2006) brought widespread attention to this resiliency- 
conferring function of meaning through his accounts of the experiences at the concentration 
camps at Auschwitz. He noted that those who were able to maintain a sense of meaning were 
able to persist through the severe hardships and survive, while those who lost meaning perished.  
Since Frankl, the idea of meaning in life as a positive resource seems to have gained 
widespread acceptance (e.g., McKnight & Kashdan, 2009; Steger, 2012). For example, an entire 
clinical treatment protocol, meaning-centered psychotherapy, has been developed based on this 
notion (Breitbart et al., 2010). This treatment protocol was developed for use with cancer 
patients, care-givers, and other dealing with major stressors, with the idea that enhancing 
meaning will improve resiliency and well-being. Contemporary models of stress and coping 
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(e.g., Park, 2010) have adopted a similar position, suggesting that meaning is a positive resource. 
For example, the revised stress and coping model (Folkman, 2008) implicates meaning as having 
a positive role. This model highlights numerous adaptive coping efforts in which people engage, 
such as drawing on one's spiritual beliefs, benefit-finding, and adaptive goal processes, all of 
which are closely tied to a sense of meaning in life. 
The meaning-making model (see Park, 2010 for a review), another model of adjustment 
that is central to the present paper, similarly accords meaning an important role in the adjustment 
process. The meaning-making model suggests that stressors are distressing because they violate 
individuals' important beliefs and goals — in other words, stressors are inconsistent with the 
beliefs and goals people hold, resulting in distress (e.g., being diagnosed with cancer may violate 
the belief in a just world and the goal to live a healthy life, resulting in anxiety and depression). 
Successful adjustment requires reducing violations of beliefs and goals by stressors by 1) 
changing one's appraisals regarding the stressor so that the stressor is more in line with beliefs 
and goals (e.g., "the cancer happened to make me more attentive to my long-term health") or 2) 
making adjustments to one's beliefs and goals (e.g., "the world is not just"). The model hints that 
having a sense of meaning in life may buffer the extent to which one perceives violations and/or 
aid in reducing violations.   
Meaning in Life as a Positive Resource: Empirical Support  
Numerous studies relevant to the notion of meaning as a positive resource have been 
conducted in recent years. The first line of empirical evidence suggesting that meaning may play 
a favorable role in adjustment pertains to studies documenting associations between meaning and 
general well-being variables. For example, meaning has been favorably linked to positive affect 
and hope (Burrow & Hill, 2011), life satisfaction (Bronk, Hill, Lapsley, Talib, & Finch, 2009), 
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internal locus of control (Pinquart & Fröhlich, 2009) and self-rated heath (Scheier et al., 2006) 
and inversely to anxiety (Debats, Van Der Lubbe & Wezeman, 1993), depression (Mascaro & 
Rosen, 2005), and hopelessness (Harris & Standard, 2001). Longitudinal studies have found 
meaning to prospectively predict suicidal ideation (Kleiman & Beaver, 2013), myocardial 
infarctions (Kim, Sun, Park, Kubzansky, & Peterson, 2013), sleep quality (Kim, Hershner, & 
Strecher, 2015), mortality (Hill & Turiano, 2014), and daily levels of positive and negative affect 
(Burrow & Hill, 2011).  A review of the meaning-wellbeing literature concluded that "there 
appear to be abundant links between meaning in life and a very wide range of other indicators of 
well-being" (Steger, 2012, p. 172). 
Research among individuals dealing with difficult life experiences also replicate the close 
association between meaning and better well-being. For example, among samples of 
osteoarthritis patients, spouses of osteoarthritis patients, and women with breast cancer, meaning 
has been linked to higher levels of life satisfaction and lower levels of depression and perceived 
stress (Scheier et al., 2006).  A meta-analysis summarizing results from 44 studies of cancer 
patients found meaning and distress to be moderately inversely associated (r = -.41; Winger et 
al., 2015). Longitudinal studies have also replicated the meaning-well-being link among 
individuals coping with significant stressors. For example, in a three-wave, two-year study 
among chronic pain patients, cross-lagged panel analyses showed that meaning predicted 
changes in depressive symptoms over time (Dezutter, Luyckx, & Wachholtz, 2015). Another 
study of individuals undergoing total knee replacement surgery found that meaning assessed 
prior to surgery predicted six month post-surgery well-being outcomes (such as depression, 
anxiety, and positive affect) even after controlling for relevant covariates (Smith & Zautra, 
2004).  
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In addition to studies examining general well-being variables, a small number of studies 
have examined more specifically the relationship between meaning and adjustment to a stressor. 
Such studies are more specific in that rather than measuring general well-being (e.g., depression, 
life satisfaction), they measured variables that are directly related to adjustment to the stressor 
(e.g., intrusive thoughts regarding the stressful event). Results from these studies have shown 
meaning to be positively linked to post-traumatic growth and the ability to make sense of the 
stressor and negatively linked to distressing intrusive thoughts and other post traumatic stress 
disorder symptoms (Lancaster & Carlson, 2015; Triplett, Tedeschi, Cann, Calhoun, & Reeve, 
2012). Such results are consistent with a view of meaning as a positive resource.  
Meaning in Life as a Positive Resource: Gaps in the Literature  
Unfortunately, the question, is meaning a positive resource in adjustment, cannot be 
adequately answered based on existing research. Four gaps in the literature hinder our ability to 
adequately address this question.  
 A lack of studies directly addressing the question. Despite being a commonly held 
idea, surprisingly, very few researchers have directly examined the role of meaning as a positive 
resource among individuals dealing with stressors. Most relevant studies examined the 
relationship between meaning and well-being variables in samples who were not dealing with 
stressors (e.g., Bronk et al., 2009). In the few studies that do examine meaning in the context of 
major stressors (e.g., Smith & Zautra, 2004), the examined variables reflect general well-being 
(e.g., positive affect), rather than constructs specific to adjustment to the stressor (e.g., violations 
of beliefs or goals). Examining relationships with general well-being variables does not address 
whether meaning facilitates better adjustment per se. That is, an association between meaning 
and positive affect among cancer patients does not directly indicate whether meaning facilitates 
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adjustment to the cancer. A more direct answer  requires examining how meaning relates to key 
variables identified in the adjustment literature as crucial to distress and positive adjustment.  
Violations of one's beliefs and goals, intrusive thoughts regarding the event, and a low 
sense of resolution regarding the event, are several key variables that have been implicated in the 
meaning-making model as central to distress in the adjustment process (Park 2010). It is 
important to assess how these variables (referred to collectively here forth as distress-
exacerbating factors) relate to meaning. As these distress-exacerbating factors are central to 
adjustment, to adequately address the resilience conferring functions of meaning, it is necessary 
to examine how meaning relates to the distress-exacerbating factors.   
Lack of examination of a moderating role of meaning. In addition to examining how 
meaning relates to key distress-exacerbating factors, addressing the role of meaning as a 
resilience factor would require studies that examine how meaning may moderate the link 
between distress-exacerbating factors and distress variables, such as experienced distress related 
to the stressor, anxiety, and depression. The beneficial effects of meaning may not be in 
conferring more favorable levels of the distress-exacerbating factors (e.g., fewer violations). 
Rather, the beneficial role of meaning may be in buffering the impact of the distress-
exacerbating factors on distress (Krause, 2007; McKnight & Kashdan, 2009; Steger, 2012). For 
example, experiencing violations may not be as distressing and may result in less depression and 
anxiety for someone with a higher sense of meaning. Currently, examinations of such a 
moderating role of meaning is virtually nonexistent.  
Need for studies examining trajectories. Another gap in the literature is that existing 
studies have mostly used a cross-sectional study design (e.g., Lancaster & Carlson, 2015; Triplett 
et al., 2012). The cross-sectional nature of such studies limits the conclusions that can be 
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generated from them as they are open to numerous confounds and alternative explanations. 
Further research using more sophisticated designs is needed in order to yield more robust 
evidence regarding the meaning-adjustment link. Specifically, designs that capture trajectories 
and changes in distress-exacerbating factors and distress are crucial. In the aftermath of stressors, 
participants can be expected to have improved adjustment as indicated by lowered violations of 
beliefs and goals, lowered intrusive thoughts, lowered depression and anxiety, and an increase 
sense of resolution regarding the event (Park, 2010). Modeling trajectories of relevant variables 
over time and examining if meaning predicts such trajectories would provide a more robust 
assessment of the resiliency-conferring functions of meaning.   
Conceptualization and measurement of meaning. The fourth major gap in the 
literature pertains to meaning conceptualization and measurement (George & Park, 2016a, 
2016b). Among relevant research studies, meaning is conceptualized and measured in varying 
ways. In some studies, the measures are conceptually narrow, assessing only a specific aspect of 
meaning. For example, some of the aforementioned studies used the Purpose subscale of the 
Psychological Well-Being Scales (Ryff, 1989), which focuses on only one aspect of meaning, 
having goals. In other studies of meaning, the measures are conceptually broader but treat 
meaning in a unidimensional manner. For example, the Perceived Personal Meaning Scale 
(Wong, 1998) asks participants to rate items such as, "At present, I find my life very meaningful" 
and "My life as a whole has meaning," combining their responses into a single score. Both of 
these measurement approaches are limited in that they either do not comprehensively assess 
meaning nor allow for examining the differential roles played by different dimensions of 
meaning (George & Park, 2016a, 2016b).  
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Recently, a tripartite view of meaning (George & Park, 2016a; Heintzelman & King, 
2014; Martela & Steger, 2016), and a corresponding measure, the Multidimensional Existential 
Meaning Scale (MEMS; George & Park, 2016b), have been developed to address such 
conceptual and measurement problems. This view highlights the importance of a comprehensive 
and multidimensional approach to meaning. The tripartite view notes that 1) variations in how 
meaning is defined could result in varying conclusions and 2) a multidimensional approach is 
important as different dimensions of meaning may play differential roles in various phenomena. 
The tripartite approach defines meaning in life as the extent to which one's life is experienced as 
making sense, as being directed and motivated by valued goals, and as mattering in the world 
(George & Park, 2016a). It conceptualizes meaning as consisting of three dimensions: 
comprehension, purpose, and mattering. Comprehension refers to the degree to which 
individuals perceive a sense of coherence and understanding regarding their lives. Purpose 
conveys the extent to which individuals experience life as being directed and motivated by valued 
life goals. And finally, mattering refers to the degree to which individuals feel that their 
existence is of significance, importance, and value in the world. Studies using the MEMS 
(George & Park, 2016b), which was developed to assess the tripartite aspects of meaning, have 
illustrated the importance and utility of the tripartite approach, demonstrating that 
comprehension, purpose, and mattering are not identical and, in fact, differentially relate to other 
variables (George & Park, 2016b).  
 The tripartite approach to meaning in life highlights this fourth limitation with the 
meaning-adjustment literature (George & Park, 2016a; Heintzelman & King, 2014; Martela & 
Steger, 2016). It suggests that studies that examine meaning in a comprehensive, 
multidimensional manner are needed. Such studies would be beneficial as they can show if 1) 
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meaning, conceptualized comprehensively, is a positive resource in adjustment and 2) whether 
the different dimensions of meaning play differential roles in adjustment. It may be that not all 
dimensions are a positive resource in adjustment and that one is relatively more important than 
the others. In fact, in discussions of meaning and stressors, the comprehension dimension is 
usually implicated (e.g., Park, 2010; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Individuals with high comprehension 
have a high sense of understanding and coherence regarding their life, which may better equip 
them to deal with the uncertainty, chaos, and anxiety that accompanies stressors (George & Park, 
2016a). In the face of major stressors, people are faced with questions about who they are, what 
their experiences mean, and how to move forward (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Hirsh et al., 2012). 
Those with a higher sense of comprehension may be better equipped to deal with such questions 
and challenges.    
Present Study 
The present study aimed to address these identified gaps in the literature and further the 
understanding of whether meaning is a positive resource in the context of adjustment. It sought 
to examine links between meaning and key distress-exacerbating factors and distress, using a 
more sophisticated longitudinal design than what has been used typically. The current study had 
three broad aims.  
1) Does meaning predict trajectories or changes in key distress-exacerbating factors 
and distress variables? We were interested in four key distress-exacerbating factors: violations 
of beliefs and violations of goals by the stressor, intrusive thoughts regarding the stressor, and a 
sense of lack of resolution regarding the stressor. These four variables are centrally implicated in 
the meaning-making model as related to adjustment (Park, 2010). Violation of one's beliefs and 
goals are thought to be the key aspect of a stressor that makes it distressing. The occurrence of 
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major stressors violates people's implicit and explicit beliefs and goals, resulting in distress. 
Intrusive thoughts and a sense of resolution or its lack are two key variables closely tied to 
violations. Intrusive thoughts, involuntary thoughts and feelings about the stressor that intrudes 
on one's experience (Weiss & Marmar, 1997), are thought to be driven by the inconsistency 
between the stressor and one's beliefs and goals. A sense of resolution, the sense that the stressor 
is resolved, is also thought to be tied to the perceived discrepancy between stressor and belief 
and goals, with a sense of resolution staying low if meaning-making and coping efforts are not 
successful in reducing the perceived discrepancy (Williams, Davis, & Millsap, 2002).  
In terms of distress variables, we were interested in the following: experienced distress 
related to stressor (referred to here on as stressor-related distress), anxiety, and depression. The 
former reflects the extent to which individuals experience their stressor as "distressing" to them. 
The latter — anxiety and depression — reflect commonly experienced psychological difficulties 
in the face of stressors (Park, 2010).  
In the aftermath of stressors, people are typically able to effectively cope (Bonanno, 
2004), so we expected favorable trajectories in each of the above variables across time. More 
specifically, we expected to see decreasing levels of violations of beliefs and goals, intrusive 
thoughts, stressor-related distress, anxiety, and depression; and increasing levels of resolution. 
More importantly, based on the notion of meaning as a positive resource (Frankl, 1959/2006), we 
predicted that meaning in life would predict more favorable trajectories characterized by faster 
improvements in these variables (e.g., higher baseline meaning would be related to faster 
declines in violations over time). We reasoned that those with higher meaning would be more 
likely to show favorable changes in the variables.   
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 2) Does meaning buffer the effect of distress-exacerbating factors on distress 
variables? Consistent with the meaning-making model (Park, 2010), we expected violations of 
beliefs and goals, intrusive thoughts, and resolution to be unfavorably contributing to distress. 
Specifically, we expected that greater belief and goal violations and intrusive thoughts would be 
positively associated with stressor-related distress, anxiety, and depression; in contrast, 
resolution will be negatively associated. However, based on the idea of meaning as a positive 
resource (McKnight & Kashdan, 2009; Steger, 2012), we hypothesized that meaning would 
favorably moderate these relationships. For example, the positive effect of violations on anxiety 
may decrease with higher levels of meaning, as violations may not result in as much anxiety for 
those higher on meaning.  
 3) Are the three dimensions of meaning differentially important? Comprehension, 
purpose, and mattering may not be equally important in the context of adjustment, in terms of 
their predictive power; one or two of the dimensions may be relatively more important (George 
& Park, 2016a; Martela & Steger, 2016). We hypothesized that comprehension would show the 
strongest prediction of study variables and their trajectories and show the strongest buffering 
role; mattering, on the other hand ,would have the weakest role. We based this hypothesis on the 
fact that comprehension is the dimension most implicated in discussions of stress and coping 
(Park, 2010; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Comprehension refers to a sense of understanding and 
coherence regarding one's life. Stressors violate beliefs and goals, thereby generating uncertainty 
and confusion regarding how to proceed. Those with high comprehension, in lieu of their higher 
sense of understanding and coherence, may be better equipped to deal with such uncertainty. In 
contrast to comprehension, relatively speaking, we expected mattering to have the least 
important role. Mattering refers to a sense of significance regarding one's existence (Becker, 
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1973/1997), which is not as centrally implicated in models of adjustment. We expected purpose 
to play a more key role than mattering. Purpose, which refers to having valued and committed 
goals and aims in life, may motivate coping efforts and maintain positive mood, thereby 
conferring more resiliency (McKnight & Kashdan, 2009).  
The present study used a longitudinal design to address some of the gaps in the existing 
literature that pertain to the use of study designs with only one or two assessment points. Further, 
participants were prescreened to have a recent stressful life event that they found at least 
"somewhat" stressful. Prescreening in this manner, and following participants longitudinally 
across four timepoints, allowed us to capture the adjustment phenomenon as it occurred.  
Methods 
The sample for this study was recruited through the psychology participant pool at a large 
university in the Northeastern United States. Participants were screened during mass testing at 
the beginning of Spring 2014, Fall 2014, and Spring 2015 semesters. Participants were screened 
using the following two questions: "Have you had a very stressful event or situation happen to 
you in the last three months?" and "If you answered 'Yes', how stressful is this event or situation 
to you now?" For the first question, participants responded yes or no; for the second question, 
they responded using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all stressful) to 7 (extremely 
stressful). Participants who indicated experiencing a stressor, and rated it at least a 3 (somewhat 
stressful) were allowed to participate in the present study. In addition to the above two questions, 
during prescreening, participants were also given the opportunity to indicate in an open-ended 
format, what their stressor was. 
The present study was described to participants as a study on the relationship between life 
events and well-being. Participants were given course credit in exchange for participation. 
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Participants signed up for the study online, and all data was collected via online surveys. 
Participants were emailed the survey on the data collection days and were given 24 hours to 
participate. The emails were sent out to each participant on four different data collection days, 
with three weeks in between each data collection day.  
A total of 180 participants were enrolled in the study. Attention check items embedded in 
the survey and time taken to complete the survey were used to remove data from timepoints 
where inadequate attention appeared to be given to the survey. For Time 1, 2, 3, and 4, valid data 
was present for 177, 164, 155, and 148 participants respectively. The majority of participants 
were female (76%) and mean age was 18.84 (SD =1.34).  Approximately 75% of the sample was 
white/Caucasian, 11% Asian/pacific islander, 6% Latino/Latina, 3% black/African American,  
and 4% "other."   
For descriptive purposes, participants' reported stressors were coded using a 
categorization scheme previously developed and used among undergraduates (Park et al., 2016, 
Study 3). Each participant stressor was coded as falling into one of seven thematic categories 
based on the type of stressor. The percentage of reported stressors that fell into each category 
were as follows: 27.5% college, academics, extracurricular activities, or transition/moving; 21% 
illness, injury, or accident; 11.5%  death and loss; 7% social conflict; 5.5% abuse, domestic 
violence, or intimate relationship issues; 0.5% legal problems; 15.4% other (more than one 
reported stressor; or a stressor that did not fall into the other categories); and 11.5% did not have 
sufficient information for coding.   
Materials  
The MEMS (George & Park, 2016b), which was used to measure meaning in life, was 
administered to participants only at Time 1; all other measures were administered at all time 
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points. The 15-item MEMS, developed based on the tripartite model of meaning, measures the 
extent to which one's life is experienced as making sense, as being directed and motivated by 
valued goals, and as mattering in the world. The scale consists of three subscales — 
comprehension, purpose, and mattering — with five items on each subscale. Sample items on 
comprehension include, "My life makes sense" and "Looking at my life as a whole, things seem 
clear to me;" purpose includes "I have certain life goals that compel me to keep going" and " My 
direction in life is motivating to me;" and mattering includes, "Whether my life ever existed 
matters even in the grand scheme of the universe" and "I am certain that my life is of 
importance". Participants rated the items on a 7-point scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 7 
(very strongly agree). The 15 items were averaged to get an overall meaning score, and the items 
from each subscale were averaged to get a comprehension, purpose, and mattering score. 
Psychometric properties regarding the MEMS can be found in George and Park (2016b). The 
scale has shown good test-retest reliability and convergent validity with existing meaning 
measures, and factor analyses have supported its three-factor structure. The MEMS subscales 
have also shown differential, theoretically consistent relationships with other variables. 
Cronbach's alpha in the current sample for the overall MEMS scale and the Comprehension, 
Purpose, and Mattering subscales were .93, .87, .90, and .89 respectively.  
Before completing the below scales specific to the stressor, participants were instructed 
that they qualified to be in the current study as they indicated on the prescreener that they 
experienced a "stressful life event or situation" in the past four months. They were directed to 
answer the subsequent survey questions in relation this event. Violations were assessed using the 
Belief Violations and Intrinsic Goal Violations subscales of the Global Meaning Violations Scale 
(GMVS; Park et al., 2016). The GMVS explicitly asks participants the extent to which their 
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stressor has violated specific commonly held beliefs and goals. The five-item Belief Violations 
subscale pertained to beliefs about fairness and justice, control, and benevolence and safety (e.g., 
How much does the occurrence of this stressful experience violate your sense of the world being 
fair or just?"). The five-item Intrinsic Goal Violations subscale asked participants to indicate 
how much their stressful experience interfered with their ability to accomplish" the listed goals. 
The listed goals were "social support and community," "self-acceptance," "physical health," 
"inner peace," and "intimacy (emotional closeness)." Participants indicated their responses on a 
5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The belief items and goals items were averaged 
separately to arrive at a belief violations and goal violations score, with higher scores indicating 
greater violations. Cronbach's alpha for the subscales can be seen in Table 1.  
The eight-item Intrusions subscale of the Impact of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss 
& Marmar, 1997) was administered to measure intrusive thoughts. The IES-R is a widely used 
self-report measure of symptoms of PTSD. The intrusions subscales measures the extent to 
which the stressful event intrudes on one's experience, and it assesses intrusions such as 
nightmares and involuntary thoughts, feelings or images regarding the event. Sample items 
included "Other things kept making me think about it," "I had waves of strong feelings about it," 
and "Pictures about it popped into my mind." Participants rated the extent to which they were 
distressed by the experience described in each item over the past three weeks. The items were 
rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). The eight items were 
averaged to get an intrusion score.  
A sense of resolution was measured using the Resolution subscale from the Cognitive 
Processing of Trauma Scale (Williams et al., 2002).  This subscale assesses the degree to which 
participants see the stressful event as being resolved. The four items on the scale are: "I have 
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figured out how to cope," "I have moved on and left this event in the past," "Overall, this event 
feels resolved for me," and " I have come to terms with this experience." Participants were 
directed to rate how much each item represented their "current" attitude towards the stressful 
event. Participants rated the items on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). The items were averaged to derive a resolution score, where higher scores represented 
greater resolution.  
Stressor-related distress was assessed using a single item — "How distressful is the 
stressful event or situation to you now" — rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
distressful) to 7 (extremely distressful). Similar single-item measures have been used in previous 
studies (e.g., Park et al., 2016, Study 3).  
Depression and Anxiety were assessed using subscales from the widely used Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The Depression and Anxiety 
subscales consist of seven items each that describe various features of depression (e.g., "I felt 
downhearted and blue") and anxiety (e.g., "I felt scared without any good reason") respectively. 
Participants rated the extent to which each item applied to them over the past three weeks on a 4-
point scale from 1 (never) to 4 (always). We removed one depression item from the Depression 
subscale ("I felt that life was meaningless") to avoid overlap between the scale and our primary 
predictor of interest, meaning. Two separate mean scores were computed using the depression 
and anxiety items. 
Data Analytic Plan 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) was used to address the research questions as it 
allows for the estimation of individual growth trajectories for each participant (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). That is, for each participant, how their scores change over time can be modeled 
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(e.g., reductions in intrusive thoughts over time). Furthermore, HLM allows for the examination 
of what predicts variation in individuals' trajectories across time (e.g., Does meaning predict 
faster reductions in individuals' intrusive thoughts). HLM can thus show if those with higher 
meaning show faster changes in relevant variables.    
To address aim one of the study — meaning as a predictor of trajectories in the outcomes 
— models predicting violations of beliefs and goals, intrusions, resolution, stressor-related 
distress, anxiety, and depression, were computed. The level 1 models contained an intercept, and 
a time variable centered at baseline (coded 0, 1, 2, and 3) that captured the effect of time on the 
outcome. The estimated intercept represented participants' standing on the outcome variables at 
baseline and the slope represented change over time. At level 2, meaning was entered as the 
predictor of the level 1 intercept and time slope. The meaning coefficients for the intercept and 
the slope conveyed whether meaning predicted individuals’ standing at baseline and their change 
over time, respectively.  
In all HLM models, estimated, level 1 predictors were person-mean centered and level 2 
predictors were grand mean centered, to better tease apart within-person effects. All random 
effects were initially included and estimated in the model, and were subsequently treated as fixed 
effects if results showed them to be non-significant. Time was included in all of the models as 
well, to control for the effects of time, and to more confidently attribute the change in the 
outcomes to the change in the predictors (Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013).   
To address research question two — meaning's moderation of the link between distress-
exacerbating variables and distress variables — separate HLM models, with each of the different 
distress-exacerbating variables as predictors, were estimated for each of the outcomes. At level 1, 
a distress-exacerbating variable was used as the predictor in addition to the time variable. At 
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level 2, meaning was used as the predictor of the level 1 intercept, time slope, and slope of the 
relationship between the distress-exacerbating variable and the outcome. The level 2 meaning 
coefficient of the impact of meaning on the distress-exacerbating variable slope tested whether 
there was significant moderation of the within-person association.  
To address research question three — differential predictive power of the meaning 
dimensions — the aforementioned models were repeated but with comprehension, purpose, and 
mattering as predictors instead of an omnibus meaning score that combines the three dimensions 
into an overall single score. The coefficients for the three dimensions test whether 
comprehension, purpose, and mattering all predict adjustment, controlling for one another, or if 
only one or two emerge as significant unique predictors.  
 Optimal Design (Raudenbush, Spybrook, Congdon, Liu, Martinez, & Bloom, 2011), a 
free online software that allows for power calculation of HLM models, was used to estimate the 
sample size needed for the study. With an intended power of .80, an alpha level of .05, an 
estimated medium standardized effect size, and four time points, a sample of approximately 150 
participants was needed. In the present study therefore, 180 participants were enrolled to have 
sufficient power after attrition.  
Regression analyses supplemented the HLM analyses as they provide additional 
information regarding the relationships among the variables. While the above mentioned HLM 
models took advantage of the full complexity of the data (i.e., between- and within-person 
variance; data from all time points), and examined meaning's prediction of participants' 
trajectories on the outcomes and meaning's moderation of within-person associations of 
variables, the regression analyses were used to examine between-person relationships from 
specific slices of the data. Residual change regression models, where meaning was used to 
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predict Time 4 scores on study variables, controlling for Time 1 scores on the same variables, 
were estimated. These models showed how meaning predicted changes in participants' relative 
standing to one another on the study variables across study span (e.g., Did baseline meaning 
predict negative changes in intrusions relative to those of others, across study span? Selig & 
Little, 2012).  
Regression was also used to examine meaning's moderation of between-person 
associations between relevant variables at baseline (e.g., Cross-sectionally, was higher meaning 
associated with an attenuated between-person association between belief violations and 
depression?). The PROCESS add-on in SPSS (Hayes, 2013) was used to aid in computing 
regression models examining moderation and probing moderation effects. Regression models 
examining moderation by the omnibus meaning score were also repeated with the three meaning 
dimensions as simultaneous moderators instead to determine whether there were unique 
moderation effects for each meaning dimension, controlling for the others. In these regression 
models, PROCESS was not used, as it does not allow for examination of three simultaneous 
moderators. In the moderation analyses, the focal predictor and the moderator(s) were entered as 
step 1 predictors, and the product term was entered in step 2. 
Regression analyses were used to further explore aim three regarding differential roles of 
the meaning dimensions. Using baseline data, the meaning dimensions were used as 
simultaneous predictors in regression models predicting distress-exacerbating variables and 
distress variables. The beta coefficients from these models indicated how each meaning 
dimension related to the outcome variables after accounting for the other meaning dimensions — 
that is, they showed whether each dimension had unique predictive power relative to one another 
and how they compared with one another. We further supplemented these regression results with 
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relative importance analyses (Johnson & LeBreton, 2004). Experts have pointed out that when 
predictors in a model are correlated, the betas that emerge in regression analyses could paint a 
distorted picture of the relative importance of the predictors (Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2011). 
Relative importance analysis addresses this limitation and can partition the overall regression 
model variance into constituent parts and attribute each part to the different model predictors 
(Johnson & LeBreton, 2004). This analysis is helpful in the context of aim three as it 
demonstrates what portion of the overall regression model variance is accounted for by each of 
the meaning dimensions. For example, it can specify that out of the 10 percent of variance 
accounted for in stressor-related distress, 20 percent is attributable to comprehension, 10 percent 
to purpose, and 5 percent to mattering.  
Of the two types of relative importance analysis that can computed, here we use the 
relative weight analysis option (estimates based on bootstrapping with 10,000 replications). All 
relative importance analyses were conducted in R using syntax generated through a web 
application (Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2014). In reporting the results below, we provide the raw 
weights — which represent the percent of the variance in the criterion accounted for by the 
predictor — and the 95 percent confidence intervals around the raw weights. For ease of 
interpretation, we also report what percent of the overall regression model was accounted for by 
each predictor.   
Results 
Descriptives and Intercorrelations  
See Table 1 for descriptives of variables across the study span. The mean level of 
stressor-related distress at baseline was 4.61 — which was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 
1 (not at all distressful) to 7 (extremely distressful) — indicating that at the beginning of the 
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study, as a whole, participants found their stressor to be at least "moderately stressful." The mean 
stressor-related distress declined to 2.94 by the end of the study, indicating improving adjustment 
over time. The mean scores on the other variables painted a similar picture. With the exception 
of resolution, scores on the variables appeared to be decreasing over study span; resolution 
increased as expected. Thus, recruitment and screening efforts seemed successful in capturing 
participants who were actively adjusting to a significant stressor, and who, consistent with 
coping models (Park, 2010), showed improved adjustment over time. Intraclass correlation (ICC) 
was computed for each variable to see if each had sufficient within-person variance to warrant 
using HLM (see Table 1). ICCs indicated that there was sufficient within-person variation in the 
variables.   
Baseline intercorrelations between study variables can be seen in Table 2. Correlations of 
meaning with the other variables were consistent with a view of meaning as a positive resource, 
showing that higher meaning was associated with lesser violations of beliefs and goals, intrusive 
thoughts, stressor-related distress, anxiety, and depression, and a greater sense of resolution.  
Aim One: Meaning as a Predictor of Trajectories and Changes in Distress-Exacerbating 
Variables and Distress Variables 
 HLM. HLM models predicting each of the distress-exacerbating variables and distress 
variables were estimated to model change in them over time. Each model consisted of the 
intercept and a time variable centered at baseline (coded 0, 1, 2, and 3). Coding the time variable 
in this manner allowed for interpreting the intercept as participants' baseline score on the 
variable, and the time slope as the change in the baseline score for each passing wave. Results 
showed a statistically significant growth curve in all of the variables in the expected direction 
(see left side of Table 3). All of the variables, except for resolution, had a significant negative 
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coefficient for the time variable; resolution, on the other hand, had a significant positive 
coefficient as expected. Thus, as expected, with passing time, participants seemed to be adjusting 
better to their stressor. For example, the intercept and time slope for belief violation estimated, 
respectively, that participants started the study with a score of 2.66 (p < .01) and for each passing 
wave, this score decreased by .10 (p < .01).  
Next, meaning was entered as a level-2 predictor of the intercept and the time slope for 
models predicting each of the variables (Table 3, right side). Results showed that meaning was a 
significant predictor of the intercept of all of the variables in the expected direction. Thus, higher 
meaning was associated at baseline with lower levels of violations of beliefs and goals, intrusive 
thoughts, stressor-related distress, anxiety, and depression; and with higher levels of resolution. 
Meaning was a significant predictor of the time slope for all variables except for the 
belief and goal violations slopes, and it was a marginally significant predictor of the intrusions 
slope. Examining the significant slopes, however, showed that, contrary to our expectations, 
meaning appeared to weaken the magnitude of the time slopes (i.e., meaning was related to 
slower improvements across time). Based on the idea of meaning as a positive resource, we 
expected meaning to show the opposite effect — that is, it would be associated with faster 
declines in variables such as stressor-related distress and faster increases in resolution. However, 
contrary to this hypothesis, higher meaning appeared to predict slower changes in the variables. 
For example, in the model predicting distress, the intercept for the time slope was -.54 and the 
effect of meaning on this time slope was 0.12. Thus, it was estimated that for each passing wave, 
distress decreased by .54; however, for each one-unit increase in meaning, the decrease in 
distress was reduced by .12.   
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To better understand the relationship between meaning and the trajectories, the effects 
from significant or marginally significant models were plotted for mean levels of meaning and 
one standard deviation above and below mean levels of meaning (see Figures 1 to 5). The plots 
showed that for all variables, those with low meaning had faster favorable changes over the study 
span (i.e., steeper slopes). However, more importantly, those with low meaning started off with 
worse scores on the variables at baseline such that they appeared to have more "room for 
improvement." Those with low meaning seemed to be simply "catching up" to those with high 
meaning. In the case of most variables, even at the last time point of the study, those with high 
meaning continued to have more favorable scores on the variables.   
In summary, contrary to our expectation, we did not see faster improvements in the 
distress-exacerbating variables or distress variables among individuals with higher meaning; in 
fact, those with lower meaning had faster improvements over the study span. However, those 
with higher meaning had better scores on all variables at baseline, and those with lower meaning 
seemed to be catching up to those with higher meaning. The HLM analyses thus failed to find 
evidence that meaning predicts better adjustment trajectories over time.  
 Residual change regression models. Residual change regression models were estimated 
to see the effect of baseline meaning on changes in participants’ relative standing on the distress- 
exacerbating and distress variables across time. Time 4 scores on each variable were predicted 
using baseline scores of the same variable and meaning. Regressing each variable on itself 
allowed for interpreting the coefficient for meaning as the extent to which baseline meaning 
predicted subsequent changes in participants' standing on the outcome variable relative to those 
of others. The models were also repeated with Time 2 scores as the outcome variable instead of 
Time 4 to preserve power and to serve as a more liberal test (as temporal relationships tend to 
23 
 
 
weaken over time, it is more challenging to find a temporal effect of meaning that persisted over 
two months).   
Not surprisingly, results showed that models predicting Time 2 scores yielded more 
significant scores than those examining Time 4 scores (see Table 4). Models predicting Time 2 
scores indicated that baseline meaning significantly or marginally predicted changes in belief and 
goals violations, intrusive thoughts, and depression. The effects were such that higher meaning 
predicted favorable changes in participants’ scores on these variables relative to those of others. 
For example, the beta coefficient in the model predicting belief violations was -0.16 (p < .01), 
indicating that those with higher meaning had negative changes in their relative standings. These 
results are consistent with a view of meaning as a positive resource, as those with higher baseline 
meaning had favorable changes relative to those with lower baseline meaning, across the 
following three weeks, on their scores on belief and goal violations, intrusive thoughts, and 
depression.  
Aim Two: Meaning's Moderation of the Effect of Distress-Exacerbating Variables on 
Distress 
 HLM. HLM was used to examine possible moderation of the effect of key distress-
exacerbating variables on distress variables. Specifically, four models were computed predicting 
each of the three distress variables, stressor-related distress, anxiety, and depression. In each of 
the four models, one of the distress-exacerbating variables — belief or goal violations, 
intrusions, or resolution — was entered as a level one predictor. Time was also included as a 
level 1 predictor to rule out the possibility that the level 1 within-person associations were 
simply due to passage of time. Meaning was entered as a level 2 predictor of the intercept, time 
slope, and the slope of the focal predictor variable.  
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Almost all of the models showed significant level 1, within-person effects of distress-
exacerbating variables on distress variables (see Table 5). Thus, consistent with the meaning-
making model (Park, 2010), at waves in which participants experienced more belief and goal 
violations and intrusions, they experienced more distress, anxiety, and depression; at waves in 
which they experienced greater resolution, they experienced less distress, anxiety, and 
depression. It is worth noting that as the level 1 variables were group centered and as time was 
included in the model, many possible typical confounds of the effect (e.g., individual differences; 
passage of time) have been accounted for, and these effects provide rather robust evidence in 
support of adjustment models that suggest that violations, intrusions, and resolutions are crucial 
aspects of adjustment that can impact distress and positive adjustment. 
Of the 12 moderation effects tested, there were two significant and two marginally 
significant interaction effects (see Table 5). Specifically, in models predicting stressor-related 
distress, meaning was a significant moderator of the effect of goal violations and resolution and a 
marginally significant moderator of the effect of intrusions. In the model predicting depression, 
meaning marginally moderated the effect of intrusions. The moderation effects were such that 
meaning mitigated the negative effects of distress-exacerbating variables on distress variables. 
For example, it was estimated that at waves in which participants experienced a one unit increase 
in goal violations relative to their own average goal violations, they experienced a .42 (p < .01) 
increase in stressor-related distress. However, this effect was reduced by .18 (p < .05) for each 
one unit increase in meaning. Such moderation effects support the view of meaning as a buffer 
that can prevent stressors from negatively affecting well-being.   
 Regression. Regression models, executed in PROCESS, examined if meaning moderated 
the between-person associations between distress-exacerbating variables and distress variables at 
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baseline. Four models were estimated predicting each of the three distress variables. In each of 
the four models, one of the distress-exacerbating variables — belief and goals violations, 
intrusions, and resolution — were entered as predictors. Each model also contained meaning as a 
predictor, along with the interaction term between meaning and the focal predictor. 
Results (see Table 6) showed that meaning did not moderate the effect of distress-
exacerbating variables on the stressor-related distress variable. However, for the anxiety and 
depression dependent variables, meaning significantly or marginally moderated the between-
person effects of all four of the distress-exacerbating variables. To better understand the 
moderations effects, simple slope analyses were conducted, where the effect of the predictor at 
low, average and high meaning were estimated (see Table 7). The follow-up analyses showed 
that the moderations were in the expected direction of a positive buffering role. With higher 
levels of meaning, unfavorable associations between distress-exacerbating variables and anxiety 
and depression became attenuated. For example, the effect of belief violations on anxiety 
decreased across low (b = .26, p < .01), average (b = .12, p < .01), and high levels of meaning (b 
= -.01, p = .81). Thus, regression analyses examining moderation of between-person 
associations, showed evidence of moderation consistent with a view of meaning as a buffer in 
adjustment.   
Aim Three: Differential Importance of Meaning Dimensions 
Correlation and regression analyses were executed to examine the differential 
relationships between dimensions of meaning and distress-exacerbating and distress variables 
(see Table 8). Correlation analyses indicated that compared to purpose and mattering, 
comprehension had correlations that were the largest in magnitude. Regression analyses painted 
a similar picture, indicating that only comprehension had unique predictive power in most cases, 
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while purpose and mattering did not. The major exception to this general finding appeared to be 
with depression, where all three of the dimensions seemed to have unique predictive power. 
Relative importance analyses painted a similar picture, showing that much of the model R 
squared accounted for in the variables was attributable to comprehension (between 48 and 74 
percent) and not purpose and mattering (9 to 33 percent). For example, 77 percent of the variance 
accounted for in stressor-related distress could be attributable to comprehension, whereas only 
10 and 12 percent were attributable to purpose and mattering, respectively. Finally, we visually 
compared the correlations between the study variables and the omnibus overall meaning score 
and between the study variables and comprehension (recreated in Table 9 for convenience). The 
comparison showed that in the case of all variables except for anxiety and depression, the 
magnitude of correlation of the omnibus meaning score was smaller than that of comprehension, 
but larger than that of purpose and mattering. This set of findings, too, indicated that 
comprehension generally had the strongest associations with distress-exacerbating and distress 
variables, and combining comprehension with the other dimensions into a single score seemed to 
be lowering the strength of the association.  Thus, consistent with our expectation, the different 
dimensions appeared to be differentially important in the context of adjustment, and specifically, 
comprehension seemed to have more predictive power.   
  Comprehension, purpose, and mattering as predictors in HLM growth models. 
Previous HLM models where the omnibus meaning score was used as a predictor of the 
intercept and time slope for distress-exacerbating and distress variables were repeated with 
comprehension, purpose, and mattering as the predictors to examine the unique predictive power 
of each dimension of meaning in predicting growth trajectories (see Table 10). Consistent with 
results from the regression analyses, overall, comprehension tended to be the only predictor of 
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the intercept, indicating that comprehension was the only unique predictor of individuals’ 
starting point on all the variables at the beginning of the study. The prediction was in the 
expected direction of higher comprehension being associated with more favorable scores on the 
outcomes. Depression, however, again seemed to be an exception to the overall pattern, showing 
that all three dimensions of meaning predicted the intercept.  
In terms of predicting the time slope (i.e., rate of change in the variables across time), 
comprehension did not stand out as starkly. Nevertheless, comprehension appeared to be the only 
significant or marginal predictor for outcome variables such as belief violations, resolution, and 
distress. For intrusions, comprehension and purpose were both marginal predictors, for goal 
violations, purpose and mattering were both marginal predictors, and for depression, purpose 
was the only marginal predictor.  
 Comprehension, purpose, and mattering as predictors in residual change regression 
models. Previous regression models where Time 2 scores of the distress-exacerbating and 
distress variables were predicted by baseline meaning after controlling for baseline scores on the 
variables were repeated with baseline comprehension, purpose, and mattering scores as the 
predictors (see Table 11). Results showed that only one of the effects were significant, where 
comprehension was a predictor of belief violations (b = -.20, p < .05), but purpose and mattering 
were not (b = .00, p = .96; b = .00, p = .98, respectively).  
Comparing the results from this model to the earlier model, where the omnibus meaning 
score was used as the predictor instead of the dimensions, showed that when the omnibus score 
was the predictor of depression, the beta coefficient was -0.16, which compared to beta 
coefficients of -0.20 for comprehension and 0.00 for purpose and mattering in the current 
models. The estimated beta coefficient for comprehension was thus larger than that for the 
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omnibus meaning score. This finding indicated that the variance specific to comprehension — as 
purpose and mattering were controlled for — may be a better predictor of changes in relative 
standings on belief violations, than the variance shared with the other dimensions and the 
variance specific to each of the other dimensions. Such a pattern of results is yet another 
illustration of why a multidimensional approach to meaning may be important as different 
dimensions may have different relationships with other variables, and combining them into a 
single concept or score may result in reduced predictive power.  
 Comprehension, purpose, and mattering as moderators in HLM models. Previous 
HLM models, where the moderation effects of meaning were examined were repeated with 
comprehension, purpose, and mattering as the moderators instead of the omnibus meaning score. 
Specifically, four models were computed for each of the three distress variables, stressor-related 
distress, anxiety, and depression. In each of the four models, one of the distress-exacerbating 
variables — belief and goal violations, intrusions, and resolution — was entered as a predictor, 
in addition to the time variable. Comprehension, purpose, and mattering were entered as level 2 
predictors of the intercept, time slope, and slope of the focal predictor variable.  
Of the 12 models estimated, significant or marginally significant interactions were found 
in 4 models (see Table 12). Comparing these models to the earlier omnibus meaning score 
models showed that three of the four models found significant here were also significant in the 
earlier models. Two of these models (models of association between intrusive thoughts and 
distress, and intrusive thoughts and depression) showed that when each dimension of meaning 
was examined separately as a moderator, comprehension was the only significant moderator of 
the association. The results were such that with higher comprehension scores, the positive effect 
of intrusive thoughts on distress and depression were attenuated. Thus, when it came to the 
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moderation effect of intrusions on distress and depression, the moderation effect of the omnibus 
meaning score seemed to be attributable only to the unique moderation effect of comprehension, 
and not to unique effects of purpose or mattering.   
One of the significant models — the model examining the effect of goal violations on 
distress – however, showed mattering to be the only significant moderator. Thus, examining 
meaning dimensions as separate moderators showed that the buffering effect of the omnibus 
meaning score on the association between goal violations and distress, may be attributable only 
to the unique moderating role of mattering. Finally, the fourth significant model showed a 
moderation effect of belief violations on anxiety. This effect, which was not found to be 
moderated in the omnibus meaning score model, was interestingly found here to be moderated 
by purpose and mattering in opposite directions. Mattering weakened the effect of belief 
violations on anxiety, while purpose strengthened it. It is possible that this effect of purpose is a 
statistical artifact, but alternatively, it highlights the possibility that distinct dimensions may have 
differing relationships, and combining them into a singular score may be problematic.   
 Comprehension, purpose, and mattering as moderators in regression models. 
Previous regression models examining the moderation effect of distress-exacerbating variables 
on distress variables were repeated with comprehension, purpose, and mattering as the 
moderators instead of the omnibus meaning score. As before, four models were estimated for 
each of the distress variables, and in each of the four models, one of the distress-exacerbating 
variables — belief and goal violations, intrusions, and resolution — were entered as the 
predictor. The three dimensions were simultaneously entered as moderators in the models. 
Unlike before, the models were not computed in PROCESS as that program does not allow for 
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more than two simultaneous moderators. We mean-centered the variables before creating product 
terms to assist with interpretation.  
Compared to the analyses examining moderation effects of the omnibus score, R squared 
change values indicated that only five of the previously significant eight models emerged as 
significant or marginally significant (see Table 13). Inspection of the product term beta 
coefficients from these significant models showed that, of the five models, only two models had 
a significant product term beta coefficient. Thus, for three of the models, the R squared change 
due to the product terms was significant, but the beta coefficients for the product terms were 
non-significant, indicating that the R squared change was not uniquely attributable to a single 
meaning dimension. However, two of the models, those examining effect of intrusive thoughts 
on anxiety, and of resolution on anxiety, showed unique moderation effects of comprehension 
and mattering, respectively. Thus in both of these models, one of the meaning dimensions stood 
out as a unique moderator, consistent with the notion that individual dimensions may be 
relatively more or less important in the context of adjustment.  
 Summary of aim three analyses examining differential roles of meaning dimensions. 
In summary, the computed analyses together indicated that comprehension appeared to be more 
important in the context of adjustment than were purpose or mattering. The correlation, 
regression, and relative importance analyses consistently showed comprehension to be a stronger 
or unique predictor relative to purpose and mattering. Subsequent analyses examining prediction 
of trajectories, residual changes, and moderation effects were also consistent with a view of 
comprehension as more central to adjustment, although contrary to our expectation, mattering 
emerged as a unique predictor as well. Contrary to our expectation, purpose did not trump 
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mattering as a predictor in many of the analyses. In fact, the opposite seemed to be the case, with 
mattering trumping purpose as a predictor in many cases. 
Comparing analyses examining the omnibus meaning score to analyses examining the 
individual dimensions showed changes in the model coefficients. In some cases, significant 
prediction that was present in the omnibus meaning model was no longer present when 
examining individual dimensions controlling for one another. In other cases, to the contrary,  
significant predictions emerged in models that were not significant when the omnibus meaning 
score was used, or magnitude of coefficient of an individual dimension appeared to be larger 
than that of the omnibus score. While chance surely contributed to such findings, they may also 
indicate that, in some instances, the predictive power lies in the shared variance among the 
dimensions (i.e., the overlapping aspects of the dimensions), whereas in others it lies in the 
unique variance of a single dimension. The fact that in many of the analyses, one or more of the 
dimensions emerged as unique predictors supports the importance of a multidimensional 
approach to meaning, as it shows that the dimensions are not interchangeable and may play 
distinct roles in adjustment. 
Discussion 
 The present study examined the notion that meaning is a positive resource in adjustment 
(Frankl, 1959/2006; Krause, 2007; Winger et al., 2015). Specifically, it examined 1) if meaning 
predicts trajectories and changes in key distress-exacerbating factors and distress, 2) if meaning 
buffers negative effects on distress, and 3) if the different dimensions of meaning are 
differentially important in adjustment. The study aimed to address several gaps in the literature 
by examining trajectories and changes, meaning's relationship with key distress-exacerbating 
factors, meaning's moderating role, and a multidimensional conceptualization of meaning, 
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among individuals actively adjusting to a stressor. The present results provide support for the 
notion that meaning is a positive resource in adjustment.      
The present study appeared successful in capturing individuals experiencing the 
adjustment process, evidenced by statistically significant trajectory slopes in key distress-
exacerbating and distress variables showing improving scores over time. For example, across the 
course of study, participants experienced their stressor as less distressing and less violating of 
their beliefs and goals, and experienced fewer intrusive thoughts and a greater sense of resolution 
regarding the event. Such improving trajectories are consistent with existing research, which 
shows that among normative populations, following a major stressor, most individuals face only 
relatively transient difficulties in their functioning and are able to return to healthy functioning in 
the weeks and months following the stressor (Bonanno 2004). The improving trajectories in 
violations, intrusions and resolution found in the present study, however, goes further in 
supporting models of adjustment (e.g., the meaning-making model; Park, 2010) that suggests that 
in the adjustment process, people strive to experience less violation of their beliefs and goals and 
achieve a greater sense of resolution regarding the event.   
Aim One: Meaning as a Predictor of Trajectories and Changes in Key Distress-
Exacerbating Variables and Distress Variables  
HLM analyses of trajectories showed that baseline meaning was a predictor of 
participants' starting points on all distress-exacerbating and distress variables. The prediction was 
such that those with higher meaning had more favorable starting points in their trajectories (i.e., 
where they were estimated to be at Time 1). However, meaning was only a predictor of the slope 
of the trajectories for some of the variables, and surprisingly, meaning predicted slower 
improvements in these variables. Thus, it appeared that meaning predicted more favorable scores 
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on the study variables at baseline, but it predicted a slower rate of improvement across time. 
However, plotting the effects showed that meaning predicting rate of change in variables in an 
relatively unfavorable manner was likely due to the fact that those with lower meaning started 
the study with worse scores on those variables, and therefore, had much more room for 
improvement. It seemed that the low meaning participants were "catching up," although from the 
plots, it seemed that even by the end of the study, those with high meaning still had more 
favorable scores. Such results were not consisted with what we expected. We expected those 
with higher meaning to have faster improvements across time based on the notion that they may 
be able to adjust to their stressors faster and more effectively. This unexpected finding appeared 
to have some empirical precedent. In a study on fear of cancer recurrence among those treated 
for cancer, it was found that women with higher fear of recurrence at enrollment had faster 
improvements over time (Dunn et al., 2015). The authors reasoned that this pattern of results was 
due to these women having "more room" for improvements. In another study of breast cancer 
survivors (Dupont, Bower, Stanton, & Ganz, 2014), intrusive thoughts predicted more depression 
at baseline, but surprisingly predicted more improvements in depression over time. Such 
previous findings suggest that the current finding of meaning predicting slower improvements is 
not likely due to some deleterious effect of meaning, but due to the fact that those with worse 
distress have more room for improvement.  
The fact that meaning was associated with better starting points on the trajectories hints at 
the possibility that meaning may help people adjust faster and that the present study may have 
simply missed such effects. Meaning being associated with better starting points suggests that at 
some point prior to the start of the study, meaning was associated with better adjustment. It is 
possible that meaning's positive effect on adjustment may have occurred soon after the stressor, 
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during the stressor, or even prior to the stressor (Folkman, 2008; Park, 2010). For example, 
meaning has been associated with better autonomic nervous system reactivity in response to 
watching a video of emotional stimuli (Ishida & Okada, 2006). In the present study, at baseline, 
participants' stressor had occurred at least two weeks prior, and as much as four months prior 
(because the prescreening question asked if they experienced a stressful event in the past three 
months, and there was an approximate two week to one month lag between prescreen and study 
initiation). It is possible that as soon as within the first two weeks of the occurrence of the 
stressor, beneficial effects of meaning may have materialized. Alternatively, the beneficial 
effects may have occurred concurrently with the occurrence of the stressor, and those with higher 
meaning may not have been as impacted by the stressor to begin with (Hirsh et al., 2012; 
McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2012). If either of these possibilities are true, then, the present 
HLM analyses were occurring too long after the stressor to show better trajectories for those with 
high meaning.   
The present results highlight the importance of future research using designs that can 
capture the adjustment process as it begins immediately upon the occurrence of the stressor, or 
more ideally, assesses participants prior to the occurrence of the stressor (Jayawickreme & 
Blackie, 2014; Krause, 2007; Park, 2010). Such studies will not be vulnerable to the issue of 
missing the possible benefits of meaning, thereby allowing for stronger conclusions. Of course, 
studying individuals prior to the occurrence of a major stressor is difficult, as it is often unknown 
ahead of time who is going to experience a major stressor. However, by studying populations at 
risk of experiencing stressors (e.g., military personnel being deployed; patients awaiting medical 
test results; Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014), the adjustment process can be more easily captured 
in its entirety.  
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Residual change regressions models, examining prediction of changes in participants’ 
relative standing to one another, showed that meaning predicted four of the seven variables. 
Meaning predicted favorable changes in participants’ relative standing on belief and goal 
violations, intrusive thoughts, and depression, across a three week period between wave 1 and 2. 
Thus, baseline meaning predicted Time 2 scores on these variables even after accounting for 
their Time 1 scores. Controlling for Time 1 scores, allows for the ruling out of many of the 
confounds related to assessing these variables concurrently (Selig & Little, 2012). These cross-
lagged effects therefore provide relatively stronger evidence than what is often reported in the 
literature in support of the view that meaning is a positive resource in adjustment. The present 
results are consistent with results from an earlier study where meaning negatively predicted 
depression across a one-year period even after controlling for depression scores from the 
previous time point (Dezutter et al., 2015). 
In summary, aim one examined if meaning predicted more favorable trajectories or 
changes in distress-exacerbating variables and distress variables. If meaning was in fact a 
positive resource, it would demonstrate such predictive power (Krause, 2007; Winger et al., 
2015). Evidence from residual change models showed that meaning has some such predictive 
power. HLM models of trajectories were also somewhat consistent with the meaning as a 
resource notion, although they suggested that examining participants immediately after or prior 
to the stressor may be necessary to fully examine how meaning predicts positive trajectories in 
distress-exacerbating variables and distress variables.   
Aim Two: Meaning as a Buffer of the Effect of Key Distress-Exacerbating Factors on 
Distress 
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 In addition to examining meaning's prediction of trajectories and changes, the present 
study examined if meaning buffered the effects of several key distress-exacerbating factors on 
distress variables (Krause, 2007). The meaning-making model and other theoretical perspectives 
identify violations of belief and goals, intrusions, and resolution as key factors in the adjustment 
process that can contribute to distress (Park, 2010). The present results supported this view that 
these factors are closely tied to distress. Within-person analyses showed that even after 
controlling for time, at waves in which participants had higher scores on these distress-
exacerbating factors (relative to their own averages), their distress was impacted in expected 
directions. It is worth noting that these results showing within-person effects make a significant 
contribution to the adjustment literature as few studies have examined within-person effects of 
concepts such as violations on distress. Such within-person effects are not susceptible to many of 
the confounding explanations (e.g., individual differences) that afflict between-person effects. 
Present results, therefore, provide strong support for the assertion of the meaning-model (Park, 
2010) that violations, intrusions, and resolutions are crucial factors in the adjustment process that 
can impact distress. 
The moderation analyses showed that meaning buffered many of the effects of the 
distress-exacerbating factors on distress. The HLM analyses and regression analyses showed 
meaning to moderate several of the within-person and between-person effects, respectively. The 
moderation effects were such that meaning attenuated unfavorable effects of distress-
exacerbating factors on distress. For example, at waves in which participants experienced greater 
goal violations, they experienced greater stressor-related distress, but this effect was smaller 
among those with higher meaning. Such results support the notion that meaning is a positive 
resource in adjustment (Krause, 2007; McKnight & Kashdan, 2009; Steger, 2012). While we are 
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not aware of any studies that have examined such a moderation effect of meaning among 
individuals adjusting to a stressor, the present results are consistent with results from a study 
among the elderly, where the effect of lifetime trauma on depression was favorably moderated 
by meaning (Krause, 2007). Thus, meaning appears to be very promising as a potential buffer of 
the effect of stressors and traumas.  
The buffering effects of meaning found here have clinical implications. They suggest that 
fostering a sense of meaning among individuals coping with major stressors and traumas may be 
helpful. Several current interventions incorporate this idea into treatment. For example, meaning-
centered psychotherapy (Breitbart et al., 2010) aims specifically to enhance a sense of meaning 
in life among individuals dealing with stressors (e.g., cancer patients, caregivers, bereaved), with 
the idea that fostering meaning will improve adjustment and well-being. Acceptance and 
commitment therapy similarly has components that aim to increase the extent to which people 
live a more meaningful life by helping them behave in ways consistent with their core values 
(Hayes & Lillis, 2012). In research evaluating the efficacy of such treatments, they have been 
found to be helpful in reducing distress (Breitbart et al., 2010). The present research, however, 
adds more basic research evidence demonstrating why meaning may be helpful, showing 
specifically that higher meaning may buffer the impact of key distress-exacerbating factors on 
distress levels. Future research can further advance this literature by elucidating the specific 
mechanisms by which meaning may buffer the impact of distress-exacerbating factors.  
Aim Three: Differential Importance of Meaning Dimensions 
The third aim of the present study was to examine if the three dimensions of meaning are 
differentially important in adjustment, and if a multidimensional view of meaning is beneficial. 
Existing literature on meaning has largely been based on a unidimensional approach to meaning 
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(George & Park, 2016b), and recently it has been suggested that a multidimensional 
conceptualization of meaning as consisting of comprehension, purpose, and mattering is crucial, 
as the dimensions may be distinct and may play distinct roles in different contexts (Martela & 
Steger, 2016). Consistent with this multidimensional view of meaning, we found that the 
dimensions played distinct roles, as evidenced by unique effects of dimensions, controlling for 
one another, and differences in magnitude of effects.  
Consistent with our expectation, comprehension emerged in many analyses as the most 
relevant predictor and moderator. Our expectation was based on the adjustment literature, which 
often implicates comprehension in the adjustment process more so than the other dimensions 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Park, 2010). Evidence that comprehension may be more relevant was 
seen in regression and relative importance analyses of baseline data, where comprehension was 
the only unique predictor and accounted for the larger part of the variance in most distress-
exacerbating and distress variables. Analyses examining prediction of changes in variables and 
moderation effects were also roughly consistent with a view that comprehension may be a 
relatively more important predictor in adjustment, as it emerged as the sole unique predictor in 
several cases. 
To our surprise though, purpose did not stand out as being more important than 
mattering, and they were both found to have unique predictive power in a few instances when 
predicting changes or moderation effects. This was surprising as in discussions of adjustment, 
purpose is sometimes identified as the most important aspect of meaning (e.g., perspective on 
how having committed goals can confer resilience; McGregor et al., 2012; see also Thompson & 
Janigian, 1988), though not as often as comprehension, and far more so than mattering. In 
contrast, mattering has been a relatively understudied topic, and has more often been implicated 
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in the literatures on death anxiety and spirituality (e.g., Becker, 1973/1997; Vail et al., 2010), 
than in adjustment. Purpose's underperformance as a predictor may mean that purpose is 
relatively less important in adjustment that what is commonly believed (Frankl, 1959/2006). 
Another possibility is that many of the benefits of having clear valued goals (i.e., the key 
characteristic of purpose), may overlap with benefits of comprehension. For example, it has been 
suggested that having clear goals would be beneficial as it provides clarity on how to behave, 
thereby minimizing uncertainty and anxiety (Hirsh et al., 2012). It is likely that this benefit of 
improved clarity may be shared with comprehension — as comprehension is characterized by 
having greater clarity regarding one's life —  and therefore, in analyses controlling for 
comprehension, purpose's effect would disappear.   
Current results highlight some disadvantages associated with the prevalent 
unidimensional approach to meaning, where the dimensions are combined into a single concept 
and score (George & Park, 2016b; Martela & Steger, 2016). The present analyses showing that 
different dimensions may be relatively more or less important in specific contexts suggest that an 
approach where the dimensions are combined may result in lost predictive power. Such a loss in 
predictive power was demonstrated in the present results where the predictive power of 
comprehension was found to be larger than that of the omnibus meaning score. Thus, a 
multidimensional approach could be of value in future research.   
To our knowledge, the present study is the first examination of the tripartite view of 
meaning in the context of adjustment to stressful events. Results support the value of a 
multidimensional approach to meaning, showing that different dimensions may be differentially 
important in adjustment and may carry unique predictive power (George & Park, 2016b; Martela 
& Steger, 2016). Specifically, comprehension appeared to be more important than purpose and 
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mattering. Future research should further explore the roles of the individual dimensions in 
adjustment.  
Limitations & Future Research 
 The present study has several notable limitations. One, we used a sample of 
undergraduates, who were mostly white and female, and who self-selected into the study, all of 
which may pose issues with generalizability of present findings. Two, we started assessing 
individuals only several weeks after the occurrence of their stressor, missing an important time 
window in the adjustment process: the occurrence of the event and the immediate aftermath. 
Three, we did not collect any data on whether the stressor is ongoing or completed, which may 
be an important determinant of the adjustment process (Park, 2010). Adjustment trajectories for a 
stressor that is resolved compared to a stressor that is ongoing would be very different, and 
future research should take this issue into consideration. Finally, we conducted numerous 
significance tests, which likely increased our chance of committing a type 1 error. Due to the 
large number of analyses, the present study and results are perhaps best seen as exploratory and 
preliminary, and studies replicating the specific relationships found here are needed. 
Another set of limitations pertain to the broad nature of the current study's aims. Aim 
two, for example, asked if meaning acts as a moderator of several fundamentally different 
relationships (e.g., relationship between belief violations and stressor-related distress; intrusive 
thoughts and anxiety; resolution and depression). These relationships may exist for very different 
reasons, and broadly viewing meaning as a moderator of all of them, without specifying the 
exact reasons why meaning may moderate each specific relationship, is suboptimal. A similar 
breadth is characteristic of aim three, where it was uniformly expected that comprehension 
would have more predictive power when predicting variables, changes in variables, and 
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moderation effects. However, uniformly expecting that comprehension is more important across 
different types of analyses (e.g., regressions examining concurrent relationships vs. predictions 
of trajectories in HLM) and different types of variables (e.g., violations vs. resolution) is 
suboptimal, and more targeted and nuanced consideration of each construct within each situation 
is needed. The present study is therefore best considered exploratory, aiming to establish basic 
ideas that need to be further broken down into more specified and nuanced relationships and 
understandings. Considering the relatively nascent state of the literature on meaning and 
adjustment, the exploratory nature of this study with broad aims seem developmentally 
appropriate. As discussed, there is limited research specifically examining the role of meaning in 
life in adjustment (Steger, Owens, & Park, 2015). The present study adds stronger evidence to 
the literature that meaning may be a positive resource in adjustment suggesting that it warrants 
further attention.  
Finally, it is a limitation of the present study that meaning was only measured at baseline 
and conceptualized as a relatively stable variable that impacts study variables in a unidirectional 
way. Comprehension, purpose, and mattering have been found to be relatively stable with test-
retests scores over two weeks of .75, .75, and .85 respectively (George & Park, 2016b). 
However, since the inception of the present study, a bidirectional relationship has been found 
between violations and meaning in cross-lagged panel analyses of congestive heart failure 
patients (George & Park, 2016c). Therefore, it is possible that meaning may impact adjustment 
variables and they may in turn impact meaning (Steger et al., 2015). Although the meaning 
dimensions have been found previously to be relatively stable with test-retest scores of at least 
.75, these results were found among participants who were not experiencing specific stressors 
(George & Park, 2016b). Amongst individuals dealing with specific stressors, there may be 
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greater variation in meaning. Therefore, future research should assess meaning at all time points. 
Such repeated measurements would allow for the examination of bidirectional relationships with 
relevant variables, and of between and within associations. Being able to demonstrate within-
person effects of meaning on other variables could further provide more robust evidence 
regarding the role of meaning as a positive resource. 
Summary & Conclusions  
Despite its limitations, the present study makes a significant contribution to the literature 
as it is one of only a small number of studies examining meaning's association with adjustment. 
Further, many of the issues addressed in the present study — for example, meaning's prediction 
of trajectories, buffering of the effect of key distress-exacerbating factors on distress, and the 
tripartite view — have not been addressed before. The present results provide stronger support 
for the widespread idea that meaning may be a positive resource in adjustment (Frankl, 
1959/2006; McKnight & Kashdan, 2009; Steger, 2012). This support came in the form of 
meaning predicting favorable changes across time in key distress-exacerbating and distress 
variables, and buffering the unfavorable effects on distress variables. Further research on this 
topic is warranted as it has implications for understanding successful adjustment and clinical 
interventions. Future research should further tease apart the different meaning dimensions, 
specifying the exact relationships with specific variables relevant in adjustment.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities and Intraclass Correlations 
 
 
Mean (SD) 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Intraclass 
correlations 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4   
1) Meaning  4.99 (.88) - - - .93 - 
2) Belief violations  2.67 (.98) 2.52 (.98) 2.56 (1.02) 2.28 (.95) .84 0.65 
3) Goal violations 2.70 (.97) 2.57 (1.05) 2.47 (1.02) 2.25 (.95) .79 0.57 
4) Intrusions 2.98 (.98) 2.51 (1.03) 2.35 (1.00) 2.10 (.97) .91 0.48 
5) Resolution 3.79 (1.55) 4.13 (1.61) 4.29 (1.58) 4.67 (1.48) .87 0.51 
6) Stressor-related distress 4.61 (1.42) 3.67 (1.61) 3.37 (1.66) 2.94 (1.57) - 0.36 
7) Anxiety  1.80 (.62) 1.69 (.54) 1.68 (.62) 1.59 (.59) .82 0.70 
8) Depression 1.90 (.68) 1.81 (.66) 1.79 (.66) 1.68 (.61) .89 0.64 
Note. SD = standard devation; no Cronbach's alpha available for distress as it is a single-item measure. 
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Table  2 
Intercorrelations From Time 1 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1) Meaning  1 -.214** -.368** -.272** .384** -.187* -.460** -.647** 
2) Belief violations   1 .398** .454** -.298** .262** .301** .394** 
3) Goal violations 
  1 .584** -.347** .323** .397** .529** 
4) Intrusions    1 -.467** .518** .485** .471** 
5) Resolution     1 -.502** -.224** -.324** 
6) Stressor-related distress 
     1 .225** .251** 
7) Anxiety        1 .680** 
8) Depression        1 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
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Table 3  
HLM Growth Curve Models and Growth Curve Models With Meaning as Predictor 
  Time Only Models  Time and Meaning Models 
Outcome Level 2 Predictor Intercept p Time Slope p  Intercept p Time Slope p 
Belief violations Intercept 2.66 <0.001 -0.10 <0.001  2.66 <0.001 -0.10 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  -0.27 <0.001 0.01 0.71 
Goal violations Intercept 2.71 <0.001 -0.14 <0.001  2.70 <0.001 -0.14 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  -0.40 <0.001 0.04 0.21 
Intrusions Intercept 2.90 <0.001 -0.28 <0.001  2.89 <0.001 -0.28 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  -0.32 <0.001 0.08 0.07 
Resoultion Intercept 3.80 <0.001 0.28 <0.001  3.81 <0.001 0.28 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  0.67 <0.001 -0.18 <0.001 
Stressor-related 
distress 
Intercept 
4.45 <0.001 -0.55 <0.001  1.89 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  -0.48 <0.001 0.06 <.01 
Anxiety  Intercept 1.78 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001  1.78 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  -0.28 <0.001 0.04 0.04 
Depression Intercept 1.89 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001  1.89 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001 
 Meaning - - - -  -0.48 <0.001 0.06 <.01 
Note. p = significance value. 
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Table 4 
Residual Change Regression Models 
 Time 2  Time 4 
 β p  β p 
DV: Belief violations      
 Belief violations Time 1 .636 <.001  .557 <.001 
 Meaning Time 1 -.159 .008  -.079 .264 
 Model R2 .475 <.001  .336 <.001 
DV: Goal violations      
 Goal violations Time 1 .536 <.001  .380 <.001 
 Meaning Time 1 -.135 .050  -.134 .101 
 Model R2 .359 <.001  .199 <.001 
DV: Intrusions      
 Intrusions Time 1 .607 <.001  .305 <.001 
 Meaning Time 1 -.112 .079  -.028 .739 
 Model R2 .418 <.001  .099 <.01 
DV: Resolution      
 Resolution Time 1 .572 <.001  .339 <.001 
 Meaning Time 1 .044 .525  -.054 .533 
 Model R2 .349 <.001  .104 <.001 
DV: Stressor-related distres      
 Distress Time 1 .456 <.001  .274 .002 
 Meaning  Time 1 -.064 .387  .057 .506 
 Model R2 .224 <.001  .072 <.01 
DV: Anxiety      
 Anxiety Time 1 .729 <.001  .646 <.001 
 Meaning Time 1 .053 .413  .011 .878 
 Model R2 .496 <.001  .410 <.001 
DV: Depression      
 Depression Time 1 .613 <.001  .432 <.001 
 Meaning Time 1 -.145 .048  -.181 .049 
 Model R2 .513 <.001  .321 <.001 
Note. DV = dependent variable; β = beta coefficient; p = significance value. 
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Table 5  
Moderation Effect of Meaning: HLM Analyses 
Outcome 
Level 1 
Predictor 
Level 2 
Predictor 
Intercept p Time Slope p 
Level 1 
Predictor 
Slope 
p 
Stressor-
related 
distress 
Belief 
violations 
Intercept 4.40 <0.001 -0.50 <0.001 0.36 <0.001 
Meaning -0.34 <.01 0.09 0.08 -0.14 0.20 
Goal 
violations 
Intercept 4.36 <0.001 -0.48 <0.001 0.42 <0.001 
 Meaning -0.31 <.01 0.08 0.19 -0.18 0.04 
 Intrusions Intercept 4.09 <0.001 -0.28 <0.001 0.89 <0.001 
  Meaning -0.23 0.069 0.01 0.87 -0.15 0.10 
 Resoultion Intercept 4.28 <0.001 -0.42 <0.001 -0.37 <0.001 
  Meaning -0.22 0.059 0.01 0.83 0.13 0.01 
Anxiety Belief 
violations 
Intercept 1.77 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 0.05 0.130 
 Meaning -0.27 <0.001 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.35 
 Goal 
violations 
Intercept 1.77 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 0.06 0.013 
 Meaning -0.28 <0.001 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.77 
 Intrusions Intercept 1.74 <0.001 -0.03 0.045 0.10 <0.001 
  Meaning -0.26 <0.001 0.02 0.25 -0.02 0.38 
 Resoultion Intercept 1.76 <0.001 -0.04 0.002 -0.03 0.021 
  Meaning -0.26 <0.001 0.02 0.34 0.03 0.15 
Depression Belief 
violations 
Intercept 1.88 <0.001 -0.05 0.002 0.10 <0.001 
 Meaning -0.48 <0.001 0.06 <.01 -0.03 0.39 
 Goal 
violations 
Intercept 1.77 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 0.06 0.013 
 Meaning -0.28 <0.001 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.77 
 Intrusions Intercept 1.82 <0.001 -0.01 0.587 0.17 <0.001 
  Meaning -0.44 <0.001 0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.07 
 Resoultion Intercept 1.87 <0.001 -0.04 0.005 -0.05 0.012 
  Meaning -0.45 <0.001 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Note. p = significance value.  
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Table 6  
Moderation Effect of Meaning: Regression Analyses 
 
DV: Stressor-
Related Distress 
 
DV: Anxiety 
 
DV: Depression 
b p  b p  b p 
Focal predictor: Belief  violation  
 Belvio .77       .19  .90  < .01  .66  < .01 
 Meaning .01 .97  .12 .31  -.20   .08      
 Interaction term -.09 .44  -.16  < .01  -.10 .02 
 ΔR2 .00 .44  .05  < .01  .02      .02      
 Model R2 .09 < .01  .31 < .01  .50  < .01 
Focal predictor: Goal violation  
 Goalvio 1.34 .03  .72 .00  .89 .00 
 Meaning .33 .34  .04       .78  -.06 .58 
 Interaction term -.18 .14  -.11       .02  -.13  < .01 
 ΔR2 .01 .14  .02 .02  .03  < .01 
 Model R2 .12  < .01  .29  < .01  .54  < .01 
Focal predictor: Intrusions  
 Intrusions 1.39 .01  .77 .00  .84 < .01 
 Meaning .31 .39  .07 .60  -.06 .64 
 Interaction term -.13 .23  -.10 .01  -.12 
  < .01 
 ΔR2 .01 .23  .02      .01  .03   < .01 
 Model R2 .28  < .01  .37 < .01  .54  < .01 
Focal predictor: Resolution  
 Resolution -.59 .11      -.32 .04  -.36 .02 
 Meaning -.12 .69  -.52 < .01  -.71  < .01 
 Interaction term .03       .71  .06 .06  .06 .03 
 ΔR2 .00 .71  .02 .06  .02 .03 
 Model R2 .25  < .01  .23 < .01  .44 < .01 
Note. DV = dependent variable; b = unstandardized regression coefficient; p = significance value.   
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Table 7  
Simple Slopes Analyses 
  DV: Anxiety  DV: Depression 
Predictor Meaning b p  b p 
Belief 
violations 
Low  .26 < .01  .27 < .01 
Average .12 < .01  .18 < .01 
 High -.01 .81  .10 .08 
Goal 
violations 
Low  .28 < .01  .37 < .01 
Average .18 < .01  .25 < .01 
 High .09 .13  .14 .01 
Intrusions Low  .34 < .01  .34 < .01 
 Average .25 < .01  .23 < .01 
 High .16 < .01  .12 .02 
Resolution Low  -.08 .06  -.10 .01 
 Average -.03 .39  -.04 .13 
 High .03 .49  .01 .70 
Note. DV = dependent variable; β = beta coefficient; p = significance value.  
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Table 8  
Correlation, Regression, and Relative Importance Analyses From Time 1  
 
 
 
 
   r β p RW[CI] R-RW[%] 
Belief violations 
 Comprehension -.299** -.385 <.001 0.07976[0.021685, 0.16728] 73.79 
 Purpose -.078 .183 .065 0.010445[-0.010617, 0.04071] 9.66 
 Mattering -.175* -.041 .686 0.017887[-0.003285, 0.070443] 16.55 
 Model R2 - .11 <.001 - - 
Goal violations 
 Comprehension -.412** -.388 <.001 0.1130[0.0404, 0.2027] 64.35 
 Purpose -.235** .064 .502 0.0196 [-0.0156, 0.0527] 11.16 
 Mattering -.309** -.099 .312 0.0430 [0.0001, 0.1010] 24.49 
 Model R2 - .18 <.001 - - 
Intrusions 
 Comprehension -.297** -.262 .010 0.0568 [0.0106, 0.1323] 58.45 
 Purpose -.156* .080 .416 0.0088 [-0.0174, 0.0329] 9.07 
 Mattering -.249** -.129 .207 0.0316[-0.0003, 0.0893] 32.48 
 Model R2 - .10 <.001 - - 
Resolution 
 Comprehension .400** .327 .001 0.0963 [-0.0105, 0.1640] 56.12 
 Purpose .256** -.036 .706 0.0224 [-0.0738, 0.0383] 13.06 
 Mattering .336** .149 .131 0.0529 [-0.0389, 0.1055] 30.82 
 Model R2  .17 <.001 - - 
Stressor-related distress 
 Comprehension -.294** -.405 <.001 0.0853 [0.0308, 0.1675] 77.40 
 Purpose -.048 .190 .051 0.0114 [-0.0050, 0.0478] 10.32 
 Mattering -.142 -.001 .988 0.0135 [-0.0024, 0.0508] 12.28 
 Model R2 - .11 <.001 - - 
Anxiety 
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 Comprehension -.453** -.320 .001 0.1125 [0.0491, 0.2077] 49.98 
 Purpose -.344** -.060 .504 0.0448 [0.0089, 0.1111] 19.88 
 Mattering -.393** -.151 .108 0.0679 [0.0245, 0.1391] 30.14 
 Model R2 - .23 <.001 - - 
Depression 
 Comprehension -.627** -.423 <.001 0.2092 [0.1289, 0.2819] 47.82 
 Purpose -.515** -.160 .038 0.1094 [0.0450, 0.1627] 25.00 
 Mattering -.536** -.167 .038 0.1189 [0.0546, 0.1702] 27.18 
 Model R2 - .44 <.001 - - 
Note. r = correlation coefficient (asterisks indicate significance; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01); β = regression beta coefficient; p= significance value for beta 
coefficient; RW[CI] = relative weight and associated confidence interval; R-RW = relative weight rescaled as a percentage of the total model variance.  
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Table 9 
Correlations Between Study Variables and Meaning and Meaning Dimensions from Time 1 
 Meaning Comprehension Purpose Mattering 
Belief violations  -.214** -.299
** -.078 -.175* 
Goal violations -.368** -.412
** -.235** -.309** 
Intrusions -.272** -.297
** -.156* -.249** 
Resolution .384** .400
** .256** .336** 
Stressor-related 
distress -.187
* -.294
** -.048 -.142 
Anxiety  -.460** -.453
** -.344** -.393** 
Depression -.647** -.627
** -.515** -.536** 
*p<0.05 
**p<0.01 
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Table 10 
Comprehension, Purpose, and Mattering as Predictors in HLM Growth Curve Models  
Outcome Level 2 Predictor Intercept p Time Slope p 
Belief violations Intercept 2.66 <0.001 -0.10 <0.001 
 Comprehension -0.41 <0.001 0.06 0.10 
 Purpose 0.17 0.09 -0.03 0.24 
 Mattering -0.02 0.79 -0.02 0.46 
Goal violations Intercept 2.70 <0.001 -0.13 <0.001 
 Comprehension -0.35 <0.001 0.03 0.50 
 Purpose 0.04 0.69 -0.05 0.10 
 Mattering -0.09 0.23 0.05 0.07 
Intrusions Intercept 2.90 <0.001 -0.28 <0.001 
 Comprehension -0.29 <.01 0.08 0.08 
 Purpose 0.11 0.27 -0.07 0.06 
 Mattering -0.12 0.11 0.05 0.14 
Resolution Intercept 3.81 <0.001 0.28 <0.001 
 Comprehension 0.44 <.01 -0.14 0.03 
 Purpose 0.01 0.94 0.00 0.98 
 Mattering 0.20 0.12 -0.04 0.50 
Stressor-related distress Intercept 4.44 <0.001 -0.54 <0.001 
 Comprehension -0.52 <0.001 0.17 <0.05 
 Purpose 0.20 0.12 -0.06 0.43 
\ Mattering -0.03 0.76 0.01 0.91 
Anxiety Intercept 1.78 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001 
 Comprehension -0.18 <.01 0.00 0.79 
 Purpose -0.01 0.82 0.03 0.16 
 Mattering -0.08 0.10 0.02 0.28 
Depression Intercept 1.89 <0.001 -0.06 <0.001 
 Comprehension -0.28 <0.001 0.02 0.45 
 Purpose -0.10 0.04 0.03 0.09 
 Mattering -0.11 0.01 0.02 0.33 
Note. p = significance value.  
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Table 11 
Comprehension, Purpose, and Mattering as Predictors in Residual Change Regression Models  
 
 
 
 
    β p   
DV: Belief violations Time 2 
 Belief violations Time 1  .61 <.001   
 Comprehension  -.20 <.05   
 Purpose  .00 .96   
 Mattering  .00 .98   
 Model R2  .49 <.001   
DV: Goal violations Time 2 
 Goal violations Time 1  .53 <.001   
 Comprehension  -.10 .28   
 Purpose  -.09 .33   
 Mattering  .03 .78   
 Model R2  .36 <.001   
DV: Intrusions Time 2 
 Intrusions Time 1  .60 <.001   
 Comprehension  -.13 .13   
 Purpose  .01 .87   
 Mattering  -.01 .87   
 Model R2  .42 <.001   
DV: Resolution Time 2 
 Resolution Time 1  .59  <.001   
 Comprehension  -.08 .37   
 Purpose  .11 .22   
 Mattering  .02 .86   
 Model R2  .36 <.001   
DV: Stressor-related distress Time 2 
 Stressor-related distress 
Time 1 
 ..46 <.001   
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 Comprehension  .00 .97   
 Purpose  -.09 .38   
 Mattering  .01 .94   
 Model R2  .23 <.001   
DV: Anxiety Time 2 
 Anxiety Time 1  .72 <.001   
 Comprehension  -.04 .67   
 Purpose  .07 .39   
 Mattering  .02 .77   
 Model R2  .50 <.001   
DV: Depression Time 2 
 Depression Time 1  .60 <.001   
 Comprehension  -.12 .15   
 Purpose  .02 .82   
 Mattering  -.07 .38   
 Model R2  .52 <.001   
Note. DV = dependent variable; β = beta coefficient; p = significance value. 
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Table 12 
Comprehension, Purpose, and Mattering as Moderators in HLM Analyses 
Outcome 
L1 
Predictor 
Level 2 
Predictor 
Intercept p Time Slope p 
Level 1 
Predictor 
Slope 
p  
Stressor-
related 
distress 
Belief 
violations 
Intercept 4.39 <0.001 -0.50 <0.001 0.35 <0.001  
Comprehension -0.47 <0.001 0.13 0.08 -0.14 0.32  
 Purpose 0.16 0.23 -0.03 0.70 0.14 0.46  
  Mattering -0.03 0.82 0.00 0.98 -0.10 0.50  
 Goal 
violations 
Intercept 4.36 <0.001 -0.48 <0.001 0.40 <0.001  
 Comprehension -0.53 <0.001 0.18 0.01 0.13 0.30  
  Purpose 0.17 0.17 -0.04 0.60 0.01 0.96  
  Mattering 0.05 0.69 -0.05 0.44 -0.26 0.01  
 Intrusions Intercept 4.08 <0.001 -0.28 <0.001 0.91 <0.001  
  Comprehension -0.38 <.01 0.07 0.28 -0.20 0.07  
  Purpose 0.13 0.35 -0.02 0.80 -0.01 0.93  
  Mattering 0.01 0.95 -0.02 0.71 0.06 0.50  
 Resoultion Intercept 4.28 <0.001 -0.42 <0.001 -0.36 <0.001  
  Comprehension -0.43 0.001 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11  
  Purpose 0.18 0.18 -0.06 0.51 -0.05 0.60  
  Mattering 0.02 0.88 -0.03 0.65 0.06 0.34  
Anxiety Belief 
violations 
Intercept 1.77 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 0.06 0.07  
 Comprehension -0.17 <.01 -0.01 0.53 -0.02 0.55  
  Purpose -0.04 0.53 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.08  
  Mattering -0.06 0.20 0.00 0.92 -0.08 0.03  
 Goal 
violations 
Intercept 1.77 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 0.06 0.01  
 Comprehension -0.18 <.01 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.47  
  Purpose -0.02 0.70 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.94  
  Mattering -0.07 0.16 0.01 0.65 -0.01 0.71  
 Intrusions Intercept 1.74 <0.001 -0.03 0.04 0.10 <0.001  
  Comprehension -0.16 <.01 -0.02 0.38 -0.02 0.56  
  Purpose -0.03 0.65 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.88  
  Mattering -0.07 0.18 0.01 0.75 -0.01 0.83  
 Resoultion Intercept 1.76 <0.001 -0.04 <.01 -0.03 0.03  
  Comprehension -0.17 <.01 -0.01 0.56 0.02 0.48  
  Purpose -0.02 0.73 0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.70  
  Mattering -0.07 0.19 0.00 0.82 0.02 0.21  
Depression Belief Intercept 1.88 <0.001 -0.05 0.002 0.11 <0.001  
64 
 
 
 violations Comprehension -0.27 <0.001 0.01 0.74 -0.02 0.63  
  Purpose -0.11 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.75  
  Mattering -0.11 0.01 0.02 0.39 -0.02 0.66  
 Goal 
violations 
Intercept 1.87 <0.001 -0.04 <.01 0.13 <0.001  
 Comprehension -0.27 <0.001 0.01 0.51 -0.01 0.76  
  Purpose -0.11 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.80  
  Mattering -0.09 0.03 0.01 0.69 -0.03 0.46  
 Intrusions Intercept 1.82 <0.001 -0.01 0.70 0.18 <0.001  
  Comprehension -0.24 <0.001 -0.01 0.51 -0.09 0.02  
  Purpose -0.12 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.81  
  Mattering -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.75  
 Resoultion Intercept 1.86 <0.001 -0.04 <.01 -0.05 0.02  
  Comprehension -0.25 <0.001 0.00 0.91 0.05 0.11  
  Purpose -0.11 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.15  
  Mattering -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.53 0.03 0.23  
Note. p = significance value.  
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Table 13 
Comprehension, Purpose, and Mattering as Moderators in Regression Models 
 
DV: Distress  DV: Anxiety  DV: Depression 
β p  β p  β p 
Focal Predictor: Belief violations  
 Belief violations .161 .045  .188 <.01  .246 <.001 
 Comprehension -.317 <.01  -.222 .021  -.308 <.001 
 Purpose .116 .252  -.133 .140  -.231 <.01 
 Mattering .024 .817  -.126 .169  -.143 .064 
 
Comprehension X  belief 
violations -.004 .965  -.135 .144  -.064 .413 
 Purpose X belief violations .025 .798  -.082 .347  -.009 .904 
 
Mattering X belief 
violations -.065 .549  -.052 .596  -.077 .346 
 ΔR2 .003 .907  .053 <.01  .018 .117 
 Model R2 .130 <.01  .312 <.001  .512 <.001 
Focal Predictor: Goal violations  
 Goal violations .251 <.01  .271 <.001  .348 <.001 
 Comprehension -.287 <.01  -.209 <.01  -.279 <.001 
 Purpose .128 .190  -.077 .389  -.191 <.01 
 Mattering .032 .748  -.136 .140  -.140 .058 
 
Comprehension X goal 
violations .003 .976  -.102 .290  -.102 .188 
 
Purpose X goal 
violations .015 .894  -.014 .894  .001 .986 
 
Mattering X goal 
violations -.111 .285  -.053 .585  -.080 .303 
 ΔR2 .010 .598  .023 .154  .026 <.05 
 Model R2 .162 <.001  .298 <.001  .548 <.001 
Focal Predictor: Intrusions  
 Intrusions .471 <.001  .391 <.001  .319 <.001 
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Note. DV = dependent variable; β = beta regression coefficient; p = significance value. 
 Comprehension -.275 <.01  -.218 <.05  -.336 <.001 
 Purpose .143 .100  -.105 .202  -.199 .005 
 Mattering .061 .499  -.071 .406  -.103 .162 
 
Comprehension X 
intrusions .044 .617  -.184 <.05  -.111 .128 
 Purpose X intrusions -.025 .802  .120 .195  .049 .533 
 Mattering X intrusions -.092 .376  -.103 .293  -.114 .177 
 ΔR2 .008 .613  .038 <.05  .029 <.05 
 Model R2 .320 <.001  .393 <.001  .553 <.001 
Focal Predictor: Resolution  
 Resolution -.474 <.001  -.042 .568  -.073 .250 
 Comprehension -.263 <.01  -.340 <.01  -.417 <.001 
 Purpose .099 .312  -.062 .535  -.137 .108 
 Mattering .125 .196  -.116 .241  -.159 .062 
 Comprehension X resolution -.043 .645  -.063 .524  .012 .891 
 Purpose X resolution -.091 .371  -.019 .852  .039 .661 
 Mattering X resolution .161 .090  .233 <.05  .100 .243 
 ΔR2 .013 .402  .034 .055  .018 .136 
 Model R2 .299 <.001  .261 <.001  .459 <.001 
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Figure 1. Estimated trajectory of intrusions across time at mean levels of meaning and one 
standard deviation above and below mean levels of meaning.  
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Figure 2. Estimated trajectory of resolution across time at mean levels of meaning and one 
standard deviation above and below mean levels of meaning.  
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Figure 3. Estimated trajectory of stressor-related distress across time at mean levels of meaning 
and one standard deviation above and below mean levels of meaning.  
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Figure 4. Estimated trajectory of anxiety across time at mean levels of meaning and one standard 
deviation above and below mean levels of meaning.  
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Figure 5. Estimated trajectory of depression across time at mean levels of meaning and one 
standard deviation above and below mean levels of meaning.  
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